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POLANYI ON INSTITUTIONS AND MONEY 
 - AN INTERPRETATION SUGGESTED BY A READING OF COMMONS, 
MITCHELL AND VEBLEN - 
 
Jérôme Maucourant 
 
 Introduction 
  
 The purpose of this contribution is to suggest an interpretation of the substantivist 
thought initiated by Karl Polanyi. An approach such as this is concerned with « historical 
economics », in the sense that substantive concepts are the result not of a retrospective projection 
of modern bias but of an attempt to apprehend universal categories of economic analysis in order 
to clarify the true particularities of different economic systems1. The point is to show that the 
coherence of institutionalist thought founded by economists such as Mitchell, Commons and 
Veblen are in agreement the reflexions of Karl Polanyi who thinks of money as an institution 
that embeds the economy into social relationships. In this analytical framework, stripping money 
of its institutional character and trying to reduce it to a commodity is bound to create chaos. 
 It is important to note that, rather than focusing on facts, the paper concerns the history of 
ideas. Certainly, Polanyi‟s writings on ancient economy can no longer be wholly accepted, if the 
evolution of the work of historians is seriously taken into account. But this is not the real issue 
according to Duncan, Tandy (1994 : 23)2. The history of ideas is the history of problems, which 
can suggest new interpretations that do not depend substantially on facts. It is interesting to 
remark that Ian Morris‟s (1994 : 54) attempt to combine Finley‟s thesis and Polanyi‟s insights 
constitutes a recent attempt to escape from the fallacy of the primitivism/modernism 
dichotomy3; such a solution has surely been an objective of Polanyi. 
 
 I shall, in the first part of  this analysis, give an account of Polanyi‟s demonstration that 
economy owes its very existence to institutionalised processes which produce those 
inflexibilities necessary for both collective and individual action. This view does not, however, 
requires a holistic approach and an objectivist theory of value. In that sense, classical 
institutionalist analysis4 is a way to go beyond subjectivism and objectivism. I shall try to show 
in what respect the ideas of Commons, Mitchell and Veblen are interesting complements of the 
work of Polanyi. This being so, it is possible to point out certain interesting consequences for the 
history of money : over and above institutional diversity, this institution sets the rules for the 
quantification and extinction of debts. Money is not the result of market necessity; the 
 2 
independence of money in relation to market may be the characteristic of numerous non-modern 
societies. 
 Bearing this in mind, in the second part of this analysis, I shall stress that it is impossible 
to presuppose the unity of the « catallactic triad » i.e. external trade, money and markets. This 
idea has significant consequences. Unlike modern money, archaic money is characterised by a 
separation of functions which obliges us to use the terms money uses. As a result, it is more 
appropriate to speak in terms of accounting and payment uses rather than use the word money. 
Nevertheless, in spite of their differences, both ancient and modern monies politically produce 
social integration. This is obviously quite different from the empiricist language often used by 
Polanyi. For instance, he disagrees with « pseudo-philosophies » of money (Polanyi, 1968 : 175) 
despite the fact that his social philosophy takes the money issue seriously into account. 
 
 Part One - Institution as a concept : the case of money. 
 
 §1/Karl Polanyi’s method : a point of view 
 Karl Polanyi defines formal economics as the  pure realm of  calculating reason in the 
context of scarcity of goods (when the ends are given). His interest is in studying power relations 
and values insofar as they institute a certain number of economic practices. Polanyi thus 
presupposes that economic activity is not isolated and that institutional analysis remains a way of 
carrying out economic reflections. 
 But it should be noted that there is no reason to deny the hypothesis that individual 
rationality has a wide-ranging field of effectiveness, nor, as a result, to imagine the existence of a 
whole that would be radically independent from its component parts. Polanyi does not neglect 
the determinisms resulting from individual interest, a factor which once again brings him closer 
to Commons : Neale (1990 : 147) remarks that, according to both authors, political authority 
intervenes as a result of the reaction of individual interests that are similarly threatened. Taking 
into consideration the case of tribal society, which is largely founded on gift and counter-gift, 
Polanyi (1944 : 46) further remarks that “the premium set on generosity is so great when 
measured in terms of social prestige as to make any other behaviour than utter self-forgetfulness 
simply not pay”. Polanyi (1968 : 65) claims that modern anthropology of his time invalidates 
fantasies that are connected to the “communist psychlogy of savages”5 ; man has always aimed 
at maximising his social interests  : “Aristotle was right : man is not an economic, but a social 
being. He does not aim at safeguarding his individual interest in the acquisition of material 
possessions but rather at ensuring social good will, social status, social assets. Man’s economy 
is, as a rule, submerged in his social relations” (65). 
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 More generally, the hypothesis that institutional constraints should structure behaviour 
does not contradict the idea that self-interest is the driving force behind action, provided that one 
acknowledges the nature of the ends assigned by the institution. As a result, individual interests 
are admittedly not autonomous. So Polanyi‟s position does not seem to be either classical holism 
or « institutional individualism » defined by Biddle (1975) ; rather his conclusions seem to 
belong to a real institutional method that differs both from micro and from macro foundations of 
economic analysis. 
 The embeddedness hypothesis therefore calls for a redefinition of economics. Indeed, 
what has been surreptitiously introduced is the impossibility of fencing off the economic field, a 
factor which implicitly amounts to a definition of economy as a social subsystem. In fact, a 
science of pure rational action could, theoretically, bring us to describe all behaviour as 
economic. Therefore the issue at hand involves restricting the possible scope of economics while 
introducing a degree of anthropological complexity. 
 
 §2 / Substantive Economy and the Question of Value 
 Polanyi „s (1947 : 99) claim that “the truth is that man has been very much the same all 
through history”6 allows us to advocate a definition of economy7 that incorporates the 
institutional varieties to be found throughout history8. Thus Polanyi (1977 : 27) suggests the 
famous definition that is substantive to economy, focusing upon the idea that the livelihood of 
man is not strictly determined by scarcity, insofar as custom or politics eliminate the choice of 
agents. Only a specific institutional situation, that of price-making markets, can completely 
reduce the substantive sense of economy to a formal sense of economy9. 
 It can therefore be said that Polanyi, following Aristotle, rejects the theory of utility-
scarcity value. Indeed, Polanyi emancipates himself from the common postulate of an 
“unquestioning acceptance of the sovereignty of individual wants” , according to Hodgson 
(1992 : 436) taking into account that the real human needs that Aristotle names as natural. 
Actually, Aristotle understands the social nature of scarcity that must be distinguished from the 
obviousness of “the finite state of things” 10. 
 It is clear that Polanyi, in his concern for justice (in its modern and democratic form), 
national sovereignty and the permanence of social ties, is just as anxious as Aristotle may have 
been : developments of the market contradicts the idea that the economy should be the 
embodiment of a human purpose. Thus, liberal doctrine, which states that the role of the law 
must be to regulate the means of action, not the ends, is the antithesis of Polanyi‟s socialism 
(Maucourant, 1993 a). In fact, in this type of socialism, social ends are determined by democratic 
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debates. Polanyi is equally close to Veblen. Both authors agree with the Aristotelian ethic that 
rejects the continual pursuit of ever changing ends. 
 
 However, in spite of the well-known feature of Polanyian analysis that I have just 
mentioned here, there‟s no direct link between Aristotle, Marx and Polanyi. The latter even 
wishes to emancipate himself from the paradigm of value in order to participate in a new 
paradigm based on the recognition of institutions as creators of economic values. 
 For instance, even if the real needs of man are changing, a democratic deliberation on 
social needs will decide on the kind of technical progress it intends to privilege. This is indeed 
Polanyi‟s point of view in the 1922 model of federal socialism, which leaves no place for the 
labor theory of value. In the second place, even if the ends of social activity should not, 
according to Polanyi, be left to a logic that is purely economic, it does not follow that every type 
of economic spontaneity should be abolished. He acknowledges the impossibility of central 
planning in the case of a complex division of labor 11. Consequently, this means that the 
evaluation of economic cost is not  fundamentally a matter of statistical evaluation, but the result 
of an intersubjective process, even if the subject concerned is a selfmanaged group. The local 
and concrete activities of collectives of associated workers are the only means of examining the 
disutility of labour, according to Polanyi (1922, 1925). Elsewhere, central planning, which 
makes human economy a technique, is a non capitalist form of alienation, since by taking 
responsibility away from its producers, it denies the fact that ethics should be associated with 
labour. Polanyi (1922 : 93) writes “Humanity will not be free until it knows the cost of its 
ideals” . 
 As for the issue of money institution, it is hardly surprising that Polanyi (1944 : 25) 
writes : “the war between heaven and hell ignored the money issue, leaving capitalists and 
socialists miraculously united”. Thus, it would be wrong to think that Poyani supports a 
radically objectivist conception of value. Once again, Polanyi does not base economy on value 
but on institutional theory, which enables to return to Commons‟s question of reasonable value. 
Beyond the objectivity of Marx and the subjectivity of Mises, Polanyi lies within 
institutionalism. The illusion that value can exist outside an institutional vestment stems from a 
totally utilitarian idea, common to both marxists and liberals ; this is the same illusion which 
states that economy can exist autonomously12. 
  
 §3. Towards a concept of institution 
 As a result, Polanyi develops an institutionalist conception of institution. To classify Karl 
Polanyi‟s work within the framework of institutionalism would mean the loss of his 
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contributions for the contemporary economist : the idea that there are economic laws that are 
radically independent from the rest of the social field is in fact widespread. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that due to certain recent and commonly accepted developments in economic analysis, a 
certain number of doubts have arisen, thanks to the “undersocialised view”13 of economic 
analysis14. 
 Therefore, if one acknowledges that economy is to a certain extent embedded in social 
relationships, one must spot in the economy the mark of the logic belonging to  the political area 
and value system that characterize a culture. Thus, institution in Polanyi‟s thought could be a 
category referring to the combination of different fields of society and revealing, as Commons 
often says, a human purpose. The laws that govern the property rights, be they exclusive (in the 
case of private property) or relative to functions (in the case of public property in the ancient era) 
make up an essential part of an institutional analysis. 
 In this framework, Karl Polanyi considers the two-sided nature of economy : it is partly 
the process of interaction between man and nature, and partly an institutionalised process insofar 
as the necessary livelihood of man requires the institution of certain rigidities15. Polanyi thus 
defines empirical regularities which are fundamental to all social systems and which allow the 
integration of economy, therefore ensuring its permanence. This collective behaviour, which is 
now well known, is called form of integration16, and fits into the supporting structures of 
society. It is important to note here that Polanyi‟s emphasis on behavioural rigidities can be 
enriched in a non-contradictory way by a reading of Commons. 
 
 It is relevant at this point to summarize Commons‟s main theses (Maucourant, 1993b). 
According to him, institution of social practices is not an arbitrary procedure arising from pure 
will. Institutions express the empirical regularities of social life while taking into account causes 
which can be economic. Commons (1934, p. 802) makes this very point when he asserts that the 
“law of supply and demand must not be abolished”, but rather utilized. Similarly, Polanyi (1944, 
p. 252) contends that even if the Great Transformation soundly constitutes the “end of market 
society”, the new reality does not constitute in any way the absence of markets : “Markets 
ensure freedom of consumers to indicate shifting in demand, to influence producers’ income, 
and to serve as an instrument of accountancy, whilst ceasing altogether to be an organ of self-
regulation”. 
 Like Polanyi, Commons does not confuse the arbitrary nature of a will that does not 
institute anything durable other than chaos, and the device of collective action that fits into 
history17. Actually, institutions are collective mental entities made rigid by history ; the very 
importance of this historical process does not allow an inclusion of Commons‟s approach in 
 6 
institutional individualism, in spite of an interesting paper by Biddle (1990) on this topic. As a 
result, regularities of collective behaviour - institutions - which create individual expectations, 
are the matrix of social order : this point is crucial in Commons‟s analysis of “futurity” and 
efficiency of monetary policy according to Whalen (1993). More generally, collective action 
considered as a social constraint which controls individual actions broadens the sphere of 
individual action, according to Commons, by creating new opportunities, as if the ties that bring 
individuals together could not exist without the social mediation of institutions. 
 
 §4 Money as an institution 
 Polanyi (1977 : 14) claims that : “In primitive societies, credit, through which debt is 
formalised, is provided originally by the reciprocity practised within clan and neighborhood”. 
He assimilates the original category of debt to that of gift, which implies that there is no such 
thing as free gift. Douglass (1989 : 111) writes that the institution of gift constitutes the 
“Invisible Hand of primitive societies”. In the same way, Commons (1934 : 474) makes the 
interesting point that “Primitive societies often have the institution of gift which is their method 
of creating debt, and they are even known to have set up a money of account”. It is therefore 
possible to take the comparison between Commons and Polanyi further. 
 From the birth of the utopia of the Big Market, the domination of money as a means of 
exchange entails concomitant advancements, according to Polanyi, of the commoditisation of 
society. But this is not always the case as money is linked to requirements prior to the One Big 
Market. This is why Polanyi (1944 : 257) wishes to break up the “catallactic triad”18: 
“Catallactically, trade, money and market form an indivisible whole (...) such an approach must 
induce a more or less tacit acceptance of the heuristic principle according to which, where trade 
is in evidence, markets should be assumed”. As a result, Polanyi (1977 : LIII) remarks : “debts 
and obligations are primitive phenomena that antedate the existence of markets, and the storage 
economics of antiquity practised large scale financial planning and accountancy long before the 
use of money as a means of exchange gained importance”. 
 When Polanyi disassociates the question of money uses - i.e. the modes of cancelling out 
and accounting debts - from the question of the market, Commons (1934 : 474) asserts : “yet 
historical investigations show (...) that Hawtrey’s logical foundation, Debt, is also historically 
the starting point of an economic history which is not a romance. (...) It needs only Knapp’s 
distinction of unreleasable and releasable debts (...) negotiability, and legal tender, to bring 
about an economic theory which not only unifies production with credit but also history with 
logic”. 
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 According to Commons, money is the institution defined by the rules which fix the 
conditions of the issuing, evaluation, circulation and releasing of debts. There is no exchange, 
but rather payment, insofar as a social constraint aims at releasing debts. Money as an institution 
is a device that bring a public purpose into economy. Commons considers McLeod to be the 
initiator of institutional economics because of his penetrating analysis of the commoditisation of 
debt, and above all because of the idea that the central bank must eventually go against private 
banks. It is more interesting to notice that Commons (1923 : 241) also rejects the classical view 
of money as “simply nominal value, containing nothing more in itself than a yardstick or an 
empty basket” because “there is a public purpose in every system of money, even the most 
primitive” ( 244). Smith‟s view ignores the concrete history of civil society that is embodied in 
the development of Common Law. Commons contends that  (242) : “Money originated, indeed, 
out of the habits and customs of individuals in their transactions”. The difference between the 
classical concept of exchange and the institutional concept of transaction is crucial. 
 Thus, when taking into account the case of Common Law, it is important to note that the 
practice of the judge is enacted within the frame of a changing collective purpose. Such a 
purpose could originally  have been civil peace, followed by fiscal income acquisition, and 
finally “Adam Smith’s big wheel of trade” (244). The collective purpose embodied in the system 
is no longer Locke‟s commodity-money concept, but a stable price level that guarantees a 
healthy working capitalism based on the debitor/creditor opposition. Polanyi‟s (1933) analysis of 
the Great Depression of the 1930‟s a recognition of the institutional nature of the payment 
process (Maucourant, 1994). 
 Consequently, it seems that Commons‟s fruitful approach is different from the modern 
transaction cost approach. If Mitchell‟s study of the progress of money economy in England is 
now considered, the importance of the State and of the power relations in this process must be 
stressed (Rutherford in Mitchell (1910). Actually, it is far from evident that the lowering of 
transaction costs, which is made possible by the growing use of money, is spontaneous (Servet, 
1984), as proved by anthropological and historical data. In other respects, Veblen also illustrates 
the institutionalist conception of institution. His point is not to know exactly what  money, 
according to the pattern which represents human nature in a way that is as abstract as it is 
utilitarian, should be. Undoubtedly, it is not so much exchange which creates money, as the 
development of money as a way of understanding the world which makes more and more 
exchanges possible19. As a result, Veblen (1898 : 382-383) rejects the “conjectural history” : 
“As instances of the use of this ceremonial canon of knowledge may be cited the  “conjectural 
history” that plays so large a part in the classical treatment of economic institutions, such as the 
normalised accounts of the beginnings of barter in the transaction of the putative hunter, 
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fisherman, and boat-builder, or the man with the plane and the two planks, or the two men with 
the basket of apples and the basket of nuts. Of a similar import is the characterization of money 
as « the great wheel of circulation » or as « the medium of exchange ». Money is here discussed 
in terms of the end which, « in the normal case », should work out according to the given 
writer’s ideal of economic life, rather than in terms of causal relation”. 
 
 Part Two - Money in History : a Hypothesis 
 
 To summarise the previous argument it may be said that money, as a rule, is independent 
from the market; money should not be regarded as a commodity but as the institution which 
governs the issuing, evaluation and cancelling out of debts. Monetary order is a means of 
organising men into a hierarchy in that it determines the modes of measuring and cancellling out 
debts i.e. social obligations20. This is why social integration, which money helps to fulfil, has, 
from its origins, been closely linked to power relations. 
 With the publication of the Great Transformation, Polanyi continuously highlights the 
function of social integration21 fulfilled by money throughout history. Certainly, it does not 
follow that the forms and meanings of money are unchanging. The question of social integration 
from the point of view of money will be examined in the period before and after the Big Market. 
But, before discussing this issue, it seems useful to emphasize the specificity of archaic money 
uses. 
 
 §1/ The specificity of Archaic Monetary Institutions 
 Before examining these methods of politically integrating economy, it is relevant to 
examine here the archaic functions of money. For Polanyi, money should be divided into 
“special purpose” and “all purpose” money. This division corresponds to the contrast between 
the two states of money, the first appearing before the One Big Market, the other afterwards. In 
this respect Polanyi succeeds in breaking up the unity of a phenomenon that the catallactic 
approach had believed in. It may very well be that, in ancient societies, one type of money object 
could fulfil the accounting function, whilst another object fulfilled that of payment22. 
Sometimes, even the possible field of payment or account is strictly specified. The fact that 
money uses are instituted separately proves the very particular nature of non-modern money. 
Money‟s submission to the singular imperatives of exchange is nothing other than a 
characteristic of the One Big Market institution. Two examples will show that the natural aim of 
money is not to create an integrative exchange. Better still, money contributes23 to the avoidance 
of true money-market uses. 
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 The absence of organised markets and coined money characterised the institutional 
pattern of Ancient Mesopotamia24. In this case, the requirements of trade and bartering 
necessitate the use of money both as a unit of account and as a means of recording debts which 
are the consequences of transactions. Banking operations are therefore a functional substitute 
necessary because of the absence of universally recognised means of exchange. The function of 
the banker is therefore to organise clearing and to testify to the existence of debt in an era when 
the spoken oath was fundamental. Polanyi (1977 : 142) remarks : “In the end, there is not much 
to show that in Mesopotamia, banking did actually prove itself an avenue to the changeover 
from administered trade to market trade”. Archaic banking therefore renders modern forms of 
money useless. 
 It is also puzzling to note that even when the Greeks introduce the market and coined 
money, banking does not develop by conforming to exchange logic. No doubt this is  due to the 
fact that the agora is only a “market element” where production goods are not exchanged. In any 
case, banking is reduced because of the custom of paying cash25. In reality, the institutional 
pattern of the bank of ancient Greece seems desperately rudimentary, as though the specifically 
Greek invention - the link of trade and money to the market (253) - did not create the natural 
impetus of banking, despite the notable growth in the market trade. One of the main roles of the 
trapezite banker is to change currencies26. Elsewhere, the city controls the activity of this banker 
who is often a slave. Polanyi (1968 : 315) stresses that the bank is a public, not a private affair. 
Even more fundamentally, the bank within this institutional pattern does not create money, as no 
bank loan can be made without the order of the bank depositor. Otherwise, the bank loan can be 
a capital investment of the bank (Polanyi, 1977 : 265). 
 Finally, at no time is public deficit covered by bank loans. Such a phenomenon does not 
develop until the end of the Middle Ages. This is most certainly due to a way of thinking which, 
in principle, excluded deficit, be it individual or public, as illustrated by the precepts of 
Xenophon27 ; if a deficit ever occurred, sumptuary laws were used as an expedient, as in Rome 
at a later date (270). Another possibility for financing was to reduce metal content of money, 
which made recourse to banking useless. 
 It is useful to show how political authority is at the heart of the value of coins28, which 
means that money is in essence fiat money. One example, among others quoted by Polanyi (260, 
quoting Pseudo-Aristotle), shows to what extent the regularities of market economy are difficult 
to bring to the fore in ancient Greece. In the same way, a city in Asia Minor, experiencing a 
shortage of resources and having to reimburse large sums of money to mercenaries, found a 
strategy which alleviated the weight of the debt. The rich citizens of the town were forced to lend 
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to the city in precious metals while they received money made of iron in return. The iron money 
was declared to have the same value as the money made of silver. Thanks to this procedure, the 
mercenaires were paid back in cash. One observes that the money supply, internal to the City, did 
not rise. Thus the hypothesis stating that a rise in global monetary circulations would be 
inflationary is simply anachronistic, insofar as one implicitly assumes the existence of an 
interconnected market system. This is not the case, and can explain the rigidities of the ancient 
price system. Consequently, it is remarkable that the citizens are still be subjected to tribal 
prerogatives29 as Cities can easily play on the fineness of monies and regulate prices. 
 
 §2. Money as a political means of social integration in ancient societies 
 Following Tönnies, Polanyi makes a sharp distinction between community and society. 
Money, as a pure means of economic exchange is, according to Polanyi, associated to a tendency 
to “fluidity and instability” (118). This is the mark of a society ideally based on the levelling of 
conditions. On the contrary, the organic community of premodern times is characterised by its 
stability. Thus a reversal of perspectives is suggested  (lii) : “Contrary to all assumptions, the 
origin of fluctuating prices, not of fixed prices, is the problem for the historian of antiquity”. 
Polanyi (120) suggests a political hypothesis on the nature of non-modern money which takes 
into account these rigidities : “The variety and often minute articulations of money institution 
thus help to achieve integration and stabilize status priviliges without the use of open force 
(underlined by us)”. 
 In non-modern societies, monetary stability, which is at times multi-secular, is the rule, 
whilst very openly the differentiation of money is associated to social status (117). In this 
perspectives, in the Mali empire at around 1352, there existed “a poor man’s money” (a fine 
thread of copper) and a rich man‟s money (a thick thread of copper). The poor could only buy 
rudimentary consumption goods, while the rich could buy not only these goods, but naturally 
elite goods (such as slaves and horses). This fact has an important consequence (120) : “lower 
class status (...) is maintained by restricting living standards to the coarse food and bare 
necessities that native money is allowed to purchase”. So the ostentatious standards of 
consumption are made rigid by rules that are relative to payment and make it difficult to 
transform the eventual wealth of the poor person into prestige and power. 
 This stated, one can put forward an hypothesis related to a strange ancient rating of 
money interests. Strangely enough, Mesopotamian temples practised two different rates of 
interest. For barley and silver, the rates were 33.3% and 20%. At the same time, the loans agreed 
on by the temples were particular as they were made in barley for peasants and silver for citizens. 
Polanyi notes that if we acknowledge that, in the African manner, monies (here barley and silver) 
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are related to status (118), it is perhaps not surprising that the rate of interest of the low status 
money should be higher than that of the high status money 29 bis. 
 As a result, these customary rates, associated with the differentiation of money uses, 
contribute to the establishment of strong social stratification. Interesting as it may be, Polanyi 
does not investigate this point further, as he is sometimes more attached to forms of social 
integration than to forms of oppression. In fact, the crises of Mesopotamian cities from the oldest 
age are due to the impossible reimbursement of debt by the dominated levels of society. One may 
think that the higher levels of interest rates play a part in perpetuating this state of events and that 
they are a source of political troubles, moratory institutions, etc. In other words, if ancient money 
greatly strenghens social bonds, while introducing a rigidity that has no need of bureaucratic 
control, as Polanyi claims, it would be right to remember that political breakdowns are closely 
connected with this rigidity. 
 The crises of debt in early antiquity make it easier to understand Commons‟s remarks 
(1934 : 390) : “Historically, it is more accurate to say that the bulk of mankind lived in a state of 
unreleasable debts, and that liberty came by gradually sustituting releasable debts”. On the 
contrary, with modernity, the institution of credit money, which is nothing other than the 
effective consecration of the principle of free circulation of debt, allows us at least possible 
questioning30 of age-old hierarchies (Commons, 1992, p. 390). 
 
 §3. The money of One Big Market as an institution 
 Therefore, according to Polanyi, non-modern money was by nature linked quite directly 
to a political system. Society‟s submission to a self-adjusting market would not be possible 
without the fusion of money uses into one single use : all-purpose money. This modern and 
contingent idea of all-purpose money is the mental product of the commodity-money ideology, 
which is magnificently illustrated by the reign of the gold-standard. This original metamorphosis 
is merely one part of the first transformation leading to the selfadjusting market. But the Big 
Market is only a utopia31 that entails a paradoxical movement of liberation and regulation, the 
« double movement ». It is necessary to reconsider this utopia.  
 As for the nostalgia for the gold-standard which held sway in the 1920‟s, Polanyi (1944 : 
25) observes a fact that was noticed earlier : “Whether the gold itself has value for the reason 
that it embodies labor, as the socialists held, or for the reason that it is useful and scarce, as the 
orthodox doctrine ran, for once made no difference. The war between heaven and hell ignored 
the money issue, leaving capitalists and socialists miraculously united (...) and Das Kapital 
implied the commodity theory of money, in its Ricardian form”. Polanyi, refusing to consider 
money as a commodity, suggests an analysis which corresponds to the institutionalist conception 
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of the institution. The modern money institution, once more, exemplifies the impossibility of 
fencing off the economy. Despite the role of private institutes in the creation of modern money, 
Polanyi (196) observes the importance of its validation by the State 32: “Now the institutional 
separation of the political and the economical sphere has never been complete, and it was 
precisely in the matter of currency that it was necessarily incomplete; the state, whose Mint 
seemed merely to certify the weight of the coins, was in fact the guarantee of the value of the 
token money, which it accepted for the payment of taxes and otherwise. This money was not 
(underlined by Polanyi) a means of payment, it was a means of exchange”. 
 According to Polanyi, even all-purpose money cannot exist without the institutional 
forms which are conditions of social integration. The proof of this paradox is that the monetary 
policy of central banks renders the so-called automatism of the gold-standard meaningless.The 
market economy is not possible with a currency that is purely a commodity. The untimely 
scarcity of this money is so catastrophic that a token money becomes absolutely necessary (192-
193). Therefore, Polanyi (1968 : 196) agrees with a non-essentialist view of money, especially 
with the Keynesian view of money : “In the Keynesian system the role of money is purely 
pragmatic (...) the presence of money is here taken for granted, not conceptually deduced”. 
Thus, the fact that money practices can be carried out simply with symbols is not a distortion of 
the “true” monetary system which results from pure commodity exchanges (176-177). 
 As for the monetary system of the One Big Market, it can be stated that it functions on 
two levels : a) An international level, where money is a full commodity : b) A national level, 
where money is the mediation between the realm of commodities money and the domain of 
token or fiat money that is connected to domestic markets. The central bank is this mediation 
which makes possible the coexistence of the international gold-standard and of a national credit 
money. 
 Thus the Central Bank is where the two logics meet : the one is purely economic as it 
rests on the means of exchange; the other is political, because it embodies the collective identity 
on which the means of payment is based. The birth of the Federal  Reserve System could be 
interpreted as the  expression of a counter-movement protecting society and working towards the 
construction of a national identity. Paradoxically, according to Polanyi (204) during the era of 
the gold-standard which lasted from 1879 to 1929 the monetary system was the strongest among 
the economic forces integrating the nation. By centralising the supply of credit (194), the Central 
Bank makes possible the institution of market by money. Therefore the Bank can partly protect 
the national economy against deflationary forces created by the functioning of the gold-
standard33. Open market policy organises a fall in price while raising the exportable surplus and 
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liquidating marginal firms. From there, an element of rationality in the Big Market reduces the 
“automatism of gold standard to a mere pretence” (195). 
 At the very moment that one institutes markets with the aim of establishing a pure 
economic regulation of society, society is protecting itself against the devastating effects of 
international money-commodity by monetary interventionism. This counter-movement of social 
protection, which leads towards the creation of the double movement so characteristic of liberal 
society, shows to what extent money is a “fictitious commodity”, even during the reign of the 
gold-standard. 
 As a result, institutions of money, like other institutions of societies, are mediations 
insofar as they create links between the different dimensions of society in order to establish the 
behavioral regularities that are the primary expression of institutionalised processes. 
 
 Conclusion 
 Polanyi claims that the money institution is substantial in founding social orders, be they 
primitive, archaic, capitalist or socialist. Actually, it is possible to extend Polanyi‟s anthropology 
: man, as a social being - zoon politicon - necessarily knows money as the institution that 
strengthens social relationships, thanks to standardising and standardised devices (Servet, 1993). 
Thus it is impossible to confirm, as Hodgson does, that Polanyi could have maintained that 
money existed only on the periphery of non-modern economies. Too many of Polanyi‟s citations 
regarding money testify to the contrary. Moreover, Polanyi never ceases to maintain that market 
as money also has an important place in society, even if market, unlike money, is a younger 
institution of human history. The only danger is reducing money to a pure commodity and 
thinking that markets could be self-adjusting. 
 It has to be said that his Polanyi‟s approach is embedded in a clearly socialist reflection, a 
point which is sometimes ignored by some recent commentators of his work. As a result, it has 
recently been claimed (Hodgson, 1992, p. 437) that Polanyi‟s writings justified the creation of a 
single currency in Europe and the birth of a federal state, insofar as domestic markets are now 
thoroughly integrated. 
 Admittedly, such a suggestion could fit into the analytical device of Polanyi‟s project 
because the decrease in the number of national currencies in the global financial market could be 
analysed as a means of decreasing the commoditisation process. It seems reasonable to think that 
a central European bank, centralising further the supply of credit, would control the market 
better. But the political aspect of this new institution has been ignored. In a letter dating back to 
1943, Polanyi noticed that (quoted by Litvan, 1991, p. 260) “the financial powers intervened in 
the internal affairs of every State, because in the era of the gold standard co-operation was only 
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possible if their internal systems were similar.” After the New Deal, a contrario  :“there’s no 
need to force all States of the world into the procrustean bed of federation, because it is enough 
for their governments to co-operate freely”. As a consequence of the globalisation of markets, 
which are naturally short-term oriented, the “Procust bed” of federalism seems to be inevitable 
again. Admittedly, it may be better to share a collective sovereignty than to have an illusory 
national sovereignty. It is even said that national identities are meaningless because the states 
which support these identities cannot organise the accumulation of capital. 
 But the very withering of the Nation-states goes along, in Europe, with the return to 
extreme orthodox practices. Like the gold standard, the independence of the central bank dogma 
is reducing labour to a pure commodity. This fact would certainly have  frightened Polanyi 
himself! The real problem is not the planned abolition of monetary forms that can no longer 
produce, as they used to, real political autonomy; the point is to find an appropriate pace for this 
abolition, and to choose freely the type of monetary policy to be implemented afterwards. 
 The purpose of this paper is not to deny the fact that nationalisms do create nations 
(Gellner, 1994 : 86), a point which Polanyi might well be unaware of. Nevertheless, one question 
remains unanswered : are not the new federalist ambitions a new hidden form of the Veblenian 
predatory instincts that aim at reversing the Great Transformation process? 
 
 
NOTES 
 0 The author is member of the CREUSET (Saint-Etienne, France) and of the Centre Walras (Lyon, France) 
; these institutions have given financial support for the translation of the paper which was done by Sue Hillion and 
Laurence Collaud. The author wishes to thank Claude Gautier, Jean-Michel Servet and Bruno Tinel 
(Centre.Walras@mrash.fr) for their helpful suggestions and comments on the French version, i. e. Maucourant (1998 
: 328/359). 
 1 Admittedly, since Polanyi‟s latest works, the debate has been enriched by a series of contributions (see for 
instance, North (1980), Silver (1983) and (1985), Mayhew et alii (1985) and Janssen (1975 : 560) amongst others). 
The richness of Polanyi‟s approach is taken into account beyond strict heterodoxical works (Orlean, 1992). 
 2The authors justly write : “Polanyi’s importance in the study of economy of ancient Greece does not 
derive from his essays and chapters on Greece”. We have tried, in the case of ancient Egypt, to check on Polanyi‟s 
heuristic theses. See Gentet, Maucourant (1991 a, b). 
 3In their textbook, Austin and Vidal Naquet (1992 : 17) assert that Weber and Hasebroek have supplied the 
tools to put an end to the controversy resulting from the Bucher hypothesis. But such a controversy seems well over 
(Amouretti, 1996 : 244 and Sablé, 1996 : 294) in a “post-Finley” world (Descat, 1995 : 988) i.e. we are not in a 
“post-Rostovtseff” world (Andreau, 1994 and 1995 : p. 949-950). 
 4Even if Neale (1990 :145) thinks that there exists in the writings of Karl Polanyi and American 
institutionalists a “common propensity for holistic analyses”, he nonetheless points out that the analysis of social 
change by Commons and Polanyi does not actually rest on a “reification” of society (p. 147). 
 5 Of course the same applies to Smith‟s myth of savage devoted to barter (Polanyi, 1944 : 43-44) in which 
it is possible to find an interpretation in Servet (1994). 
 6Berthoud also justly highlights the hypothesis that the constancy of human nature entails a hypertophy of 
the interest in institutions and the cultural factor. But this antropological constancy is an interesting fact : humanity 
never constructs its society in a lasting fashion using methods that are totally individualist or collectivist. Polanyi 
rightly observes that, in fact, since greatest Antiquity, man has always known how to elude ideological dichotomies ; 
liberty vs bureaucracy and total planning vs market. On this subject, he cites the examples of a Mesopotamian 
trading corporation, Athenian customs of the classic age, and the kingdom of Dahomey in the 18th century (Polanyi, 
1977 : xli) 
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 7Carl Menger supplied Polanyi with a solution to this problem. In the 1923 German edition of his 
Principles, Menger sets an economising direction - a characteristic of civilised societies - against a technical 
direction which only results from physical particulariteis of production. He does so to safeguard his Principles, 
which were to be challenged by later anthropological discoveries (Polanyi, 1977 : 22-23). 
 8One should note Polanyi‟s display of interest for the marginalist school of thought. Elsewhere, the 
influence on Polanyi of the Austrian school of marginal utility is certain in the socialist economic calculation debate. 
The future author of the Great Transformation in 1922 is looking for an alternative to central planning, which he 
considers impossible - as would his brother Mickael later (Polanyi, 1951 :148-149) - and pure market economy, that 
he judges to be a source of wastage. A presentation of this non-Marxist criticism of capitalism can be found in 
Rosner (1990) and Maucourant (1993). A translation into French of 1922 Polanyi‟s text of is available in Polanyi 
(1994) ; it seems that a translation into English does not exist. 
 9In this case, a general state of scarcity exists, as economic agents are able to make an infinite number of 
choices provided by markets. 
 10 See Berthoud (1986: 67). According to Aristotle, human choice and desires are not limitless because 
they have to be submitted to the social imperative of an honourable life. The essence of life, according to Aristotle 
(Polanyi, 1977 : 30), i.e. theatre, trials, politics and the contemplation of good, prohibits any type of effective 
economic accumulation. A contrario, the free display of pecuniary activity is contradictory to the natural order of the 
City which is based on principles : self-sufficiency, community (resting on the value of living together, the phylia) 
and justice (in the sense that everyone receives that which is due to his nature (Polanyi, 1957 a : 79). The fact that 
Aristotle has a substantive conception of economy explains his fear that economy could actually become removed 
from society. It is this fear that highlights his importance as an economic thinker. Schumpeter, convinced that the 
distinctive nature of economic analysis is formalising scarcity mechanisms, cannot accept the importance of 
Aristotle‟s economic thought. 
 11This is why any form of socialism that denies the necessity of monetary order is not  viable. It is worth 
noting that, in the case of the decentralised socialist society desired by Polanyi, special-purpose monies are a means 
of embedding economy into society in a humanist way, as contradictory evaluations of wills are able to express 
themselves. This is necessary to avoid the dangerous dream of a natural economy which is technically impossible 
when neither custom nor tradition strictly determines collective and individual actions. Weber (1921 : 110-111) 
possibly shortly before Mises, remarks upon this technical feature of money that Polanyi never ignores. 
 12To be precise, the nineteenth century transformation which aimed at instituting a watertight “closure” of 
the economy through the establishment of the Big Market was, in fact, illusory. 
 13Oversocialised view is unbearable as only a superior mind could understand the logic of the whole, 
which is contradictio in adjecto. see Hayek (1952) 
 14Granovetter (1994 : 86) highlights the social networks that create market transactions. This legitimates A. 
Orlean‟s claim about another contribution by Granovetter. A joint economic and sociological study of the history of 
a system should make it possible to remove the indeterminate nature of the final equilibrium (Orlean, 1994 : 31). 
 15Polanyi (1977 : 31) writes : “If the material survival of men were the result of a mere fleeting chain of 
causation - possessing neither definite location in time or space (that is unity and stability), nor permanent point of 
reference (that is structure), or definite mode of action in regard to the whole (that is function), nor  ways of being 
influenced by societal goals (that is policy relevance) - it could never have attained the dignity and importance of 
human economy”. 
 16Polanyi‟s taxinomy  changes even if his intentions do not. It is the unity of an idea which is interesting 
here. For the sake of detail, one can note that in 1944 redistribution is called “principle of behaviour”, whereas in the 
1977 text, it is called “forms of integration”; in the same way, centricity is first called “institutional model” but 
becomes “structures” after. It is clear that these semantic variations make no difference. I suggest calling 
institutional model a special set of institutions which includes their relations to culture and historical singularities 
that an economic analysis must, in the first instance, overshadow. Thus the Assyrian institutional model differs from 
the Egyptian one, even if redistribution is a main feature of these archaic systems. 
 17Gautier‟s (1992 : 42-52) account concerning Hume, notably on p. 43, is interesting in this respect. 
 18Also creating an alternative to the conjectural history of institutions already denounced by Veblen. 
 19This view and the deliberate use of this extensive meaning of money was developed by Mitchell (1908, 
1910). 
 20Modern history of facts seems to agree with such hypotheses. See Depeyrot (1995) and Hollard (1995). 
 21The integration referred to here can naturally cause political oppressions. This is not sufficiently 
emphasised by Polanyi (see Godelier, 1975). 
 22The money in question can be totally abstract. It is this that Polanyi names ideal unit. However the 
situation can be even more complex. For example, a slave could have served as a unit of account and an external 
means of payment, the great local values being expressed in slaves. This means that a type of ideal slave was 
developed. Keynes had, in the same way, quoted in his Treatise the case of the average goat as a unit of account in 
Africa (Keynes, 1930 : 11-12). 
 23This fact can also be the result of redistribution requirements. See Gentet, Maucourant (1991, a, b). 
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 24Polanyi (1957, c, 125). Silver‟s use (1983 and 1985) of new institutional economics is not convincing. 
For instance, the hypothesis related to equilibrium value in ancient barter processes has no solid foundation. See 
Maucourant (1996). 
 25By the nomismata. See. Polanyi (1977, p. 316). 
 26The exchange table was called a trapetza just like the table named banca from which the term bank 
originated. 
 27 See Polanyi (1977 : 268) and Nicolet (1983 : 203). It is true that financial conceptions, linked to money 
that is strictly metallic, forbid any other practice than the adjustment of spending and resources. Government deficit 
would not be a possibility in England and France until the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries. This weak development of 
banking in its modern sense corresponds to an immersion of economy into society. C. Nicolet once again observes : 
“one mentions principally economic phenomena considered from the point of view of their features or fiscal 
consequences” (204). In a more general way, it does not appear that the conclusions of C. Nicolet invalidate the 
substantive approach to which de facto, a certain heuristic value (15 and 30-37) is attributed. Certain hypotheses are 
corroborated by C. Nicolet‟s own research about the meaning of the generosity of lenders who are not anxious 
because of the absence of repayments. In fact, moneylending solidifies social bonds. Even if this interpretation is 
“biased and partial”, according to C. Nicolet, it is thus useful to note that high banking is a means of superior 
prestige because it creates social debtor. Only then can money become prestige, which is the important fact in Rome. 
 28In order to show the particularity of ancient mentalities, Janssen (1975 : 545, fn. 13) recalls the extreme 
lack of precision of intrinsic value of the first nomismata. 
 29Polanyi (1977 : 169). As a result, the fact that the counterfeiting of money causes a rise in price cannot 
be considered as evident. 
 29 bis Certainly, the difficulty of converting the interest of the debt expressed in a quantity of inferior goods 
into superior goods is a part of the explanation of the difference between rates. 
 30This is possible but not necessary. This will be the object of later reflections by Commons on monetary 
policy. The absence or incoherence of these will only abolish the emancipatory possibilities of pure credit money. 
 3L. Dumont, in his introduction to Polanyi (1983) and Servet (1993) share the same opinion. 
 32 Guttmann (1994) emphasises this fact in his analysis of the Great Transformation 
 33Thus, according to Polanyi, the creation of money is in part exogenous in the gold standard regime. 
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